The Carbon Brief interview: Prof Wang Can

At COP29 in Baku, Carbon Brief spoke with Prof Wang Can, director of the department of environmental planning and management at Tsinghua University, to discuss its new study on global carbon neutrality progress.

Tsinghua University is located in Beijing and publishes some of the country’s most prominent climate research, which is often used to inform related policymaking.

The study, published by the university’s Institute for Carbon Neutrality and School of Environment, evaluates different countries’ progress on “[climate and carbon] targets, technology, finance and international cooperation”.

It also identifies “implementation gaps between carbon neutrality targets and emission reduction outcomes”. 

In this wide-ranging interview, Wang introduces the institute’s findings and identifies key barriers for the world to reach net-zero emissions. 

He also shares reflections on the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), China’s upcoming 2035 climate pledge (NDC), its carbon market, “dual control of carbon” policy, the 14th “five-year plan”, carbon “peaking” timeline, electrification, energy storage and hydrogen. 

The interview is transcribed in full below, following a summary of key quotes. The transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

Carbon Brief: What’s the most important finding of your research?

Wang Can: We tracked the progress [of countries’ carbon neutrality efforts] from the perspective of implementation. We paid more attention to actions and used scientific methods to evaluate them. Carbon goals are set for decades in the future – if we simply look at the goals, it is difficult to evaluate whether our current actions are sufficient, so a scientific and systematic method is needed to evaluate them. We think actions are important, and the method of evaluating action is also important.

CB: Your report found developing countries have a higher “ambition index” while developed countries have a lower ambition index. What does “ambition index” mean here? 

WC: When we talk about ambition index or use index to express what I said earlier, we follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations. Hence we revise countries’ ambition indexes. For example, a country might advertise that it wants to achieve carbon neutrality as soon as possible, but take the action of setting up various barriers to hinder the flow of technology and hinder global cooperation. [Therefore,] it may be very ambitious in terms of goals, but its actions have negative effects. Our index will take these into account and, after considering these factors, assign a score. As of last year, some developing countries have scored higher, while some developed countries have relatively lower ambition indexes.

CB: So you mean you check goals of countries announced in their NDCs and give positive or negative points for their climate actions, and then calculate a score for their ambition index? 

WC: Yes.

CB: Were you surprised by the results? 

WC: I am not surprised, because I have been involved in the negotiation of the [UN] climate convention for more than ten years. From the negotiation process, we can feel that the determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active. Although developed countries have the ability and technology, and their scientists have more systematic and scientific knowledge in this regard, they are not as persistent as developing countries like China. Once [China] announced [its climate] goal, it systematically and continuously progresses. [Developed countries did not do the same] due to considerations for economy and international trade competition.

CB: The west is particularly interested in China’s 2035 NDC. What new climate goal do you think China would propose or what should be written in the next NDC? 

WC: I think the next NDC will still be in line with our “dual carbon” policy [of peaking emissions before 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality before 2060]. The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035. We already have a target for what we should achieve by 2030, and [the next NDC instead prompts]  a new round of what we should achieve by 2035. Different stages have different tasks, but they both are under the same overall framework. China has already [announced] its “dual carbon’” goals, [set] two time points [of 2030 and 2060], and [established] the “1+N” policy system. I think [the NDC] is nothing more than specifying tasks for from 2030 to 2035 under such a system. This is my personal understanding and expectation.

CB: Your report said that the current speed of renewable energy development globally is insufficient to meet COP28’s tripling target for 2030 and there is a “large gap” in the deployment scale required to meet climate targets. What are the main factors holding back faster growth?

WC: I’m not sure if your question is completely consistent with the point we want to express in the report. My understanding of what we said in the report is that although we have seen rapid development of renewable energy, and it is very optimistic in recent years, there is still a gap compared to the requirements of tripling global renewable power capacity by 2030 and the global net-zero target by 2050. 

[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripping target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster, especially from a global perspective. Now there are a few countries, such as China and Indonesia in south-east Asia, that have deployed [renewable energy] very quickly in the past one or two years, but globally we have not seen the speed we expected. This is what we want to convey at the core, or what we especially want to convey. 

The reason behind this is that we believe that [renewable energy] technology has developed to a stage, from our research, that it could have been deployed faster. After it is deployed faster and more widely [in the future], the speed of progress of this technology will accelerate, and it will enter a positive cycle. This could have happened, but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers, and the extension of trade barriers from [targeting] originally high-tech and communications products to [also targeting] renewable energy that addresses climate change. 

This type of trade barrier is a typical practice, based on traditional and very narrow economic interests. It may have ignored the fact, which actually comes from western international trade theory, that free international trade can promote economic development, technological progress, and thus bring a new round of win-win situation. Short-sighted behavior ignores [this]. In the field of renewable energy, the medium- and long-term economic benefits, as well as a firm commitment to climate change, have both been given up [by western countries]. So this, in our view, is a problem facing the development of renewable energy that needs to be solved.

CB: Can you please give an example of the trade barrier you mentioned? 

WC: Increased tariffs, for instance – imposing [high] tariffs on renewable energy equipment imports, and the intentional imposition of such tariffs. This example is what we referenced in our country analysis. [We found that countries] including the US have such policies. Our report set a framework in which we checked whether there are trade barrier policies in place, whether [such policies] are enforced, and then, if they are, we look at whether they targeted green and low-carbon technology that we need for cutting emissions. If so, we then gave different weights and negative scores.

CB: What is the trade barrier or barriers that bring the worst impacts currently? 

WC: The import controls on wind and solar, adding tariffs on them, or commerce control lists of this kind. 

CB: Mainly in the US? 

WC: Mainly in the US.

CB: What do you think about the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)? 

WC: In our evaluation, we think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy, and its impact may hinder the flow of technology mentioned earlier, the rapid diffusion of technology and the rapid deployment of advanced technology around the world. 

Of course, we have to look further and look at it in more detail, because the scope of the industry that CBAM covers will change in the years ahead. At present, from the perspective of international cooperation, its negative weight is not high. From the perspective of execution, although it mainly covers electricity and hydrogen energy [as well as other industries], its scope is not very large at present.

CB: Your report says that there is no “single zero-carbon pathway” that would be universally applicable for all. Instead, it says “differentiated measures are needed for different types of countries”. What’s the best pathway for China to reach carbon neutrality and how does that differ to others?

WC: Yes, what we want to say is that there is no single model that is suitable for all countries to achieve net-zero. Different countries are at different stages of development, their economic structures are different, their resources are different, and even their institutional political structure as well as cultural characteristics are different, so the paths to achieve net-zero will definitely be different. Countries do have differences in policies, [climate] targets, technologies, funds, and international cooperation methods – what we just discussed – [so] we think that different countries should have different models. 

For China, “dual carbon” is a policy goal with Chinese characteristics. We need to reach carbon peak before 2030 and achieve neutrality before 2060. The carbon peak before 2030 means that we still need time to decouple economic development from carbon emissions. If we don’t reach the peak, it means that we haven’t decoupled these things yet. Economic growth [still leads to] an increase in carbon emissions. Why is that? Because we are still a developing country, and the largest developing country – the developing country with the most industry in the world. Our manufacturing industry is relatively large, our population is large, and we are still in the process of urbanisation and industrialisation. Carbon emissions and economic development have not yet been completely decoupled. Even in such a situation, we have proposed the goal of achieving carbon neutrality, which further reflects our ambition and determination. 

[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature, and it is representative for developing countries. Many developing countries are similar to us. They have not achieved decoupling, but want to specify response to climate change and achieve the two goals [of carbon peak and neutrality]. To reach net-zero globally by the middle of this century, developing countries introduced some targets and paths. 

So what is the path? Achieve neutrality after peaking. First, there is a stage of rapid peaking, and to peak as low as possible. In this stage, technical support, financial support, and even some capacity buildings are needed. For example, China is building a carbon market as a policy tool. Currently it is still in the stage of capacity building – collecting carbon emission data, [improving] professional trading capabilities of the market, and so on. This stage is very important for China. If the foundation is not laid solid at this stage, then after reaching the peak, the stage of carbon reduction and achieving carbon neutrality may take a relatively long time, making it more difficult for us to achieve carbon neutrality.

CB: Speaking of China’s carbon market, in our previous Carbon Brief reports, some analysts said that it is not fully active yet, and that trade may have not achieved its maximum potential. How can we maximise the potential of the carbon market?

WC: I think progress in this area will become faster. Because this year [2024], the State Council issued a work plan for the transition from “dual control of energy” consumption to “dual control of carbon”, and clarified a timetable [for this]. From now to 2030, the main mechanism is controlling carbon intensity [the emissions per unit of GDP], with total control [in tonnes of carbon emissions] as a secondary mechanism. But at the same time, [developing] some total control mechanisms should be explored. After China’s carbon emissions peak in 2030, total control [in tonnes of CO2] will be the main mechanism [of controlling carbon emissions], supplemented by [carbon] intensity control. 

As long as there is a total control target, the carbon trading and carbon market system can play a role in lowering emissions. Because a policy tool such as carbon trading essentially aims to achieve a certain set target for total emissions at a low cost. A target for total emissions control only gives an amount [to reach], but whether this target is allocated to emitting entities efficiently or not isn’t something the government has enough information to determine. Through carbon trading and carbon markets, emission reductions can be achieved at the lowest cost. So to answer your question directly, when a total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.

CB: You mentioned the transfer from “dual control of energy” to “dual control of carbon emissions”. There are suggestions that China’s total emission intensity target could be missed because this year’s GDP growth is slower than emissions rates. Do you think this has a big impact? 

WC: What impact are you referring to?

CB: The 14th “five-year plan”. The 14th five-year plan has set a total energy intensity reduction goal but it could be missed because economic growth is slower than energy consumption.

WC: The energy intensity goal, yes. 

CB: Do you think this will slow down the entire emission reduction process [planned in the 14th “five-year plan”]? 

WC: I think this [energy intensity] goal is to serve the broader goal of emissions reduction, so whether it was achievable or not may have been a factor that was considered when the goal was originally set. For example, when the goal was set around 2020, it did not take into account the economic form and technological changes of recent years. In fact, there is another goal corresponding to this goal, which is the total amount of renewable energy [for 1,200GW of wind and solar capacity by 2030]…[which was] achieved very quickly. So we set some goals that are easy to achieve and some goals that may be more difficult to achieve than expected. I think I should go back to my previous point that the individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not. 

From the perspective of promoting “dual carbon” work in recent years, China has made great progress in the construction of its [climate] policies, reducing the cost of developing renewable energy technologies, and [increasing] the pace of deploying [them]. From the central government to the provincial government and then to the city-level government, there is a top-down push for capacity building and promotion of [the government’s] ecological work around raising public awareness and collecting data, such as the building blocks for baseline data, including exploring the integration of carbon assessments into environmental impact assessments. These are also the views expressed in our report on global progress on carbon neutrality. From this perspective, we think that China’s work over the past three years – since general secretary Xi Jinping announced the “dual-carbon” goals – has been on the right track, helping us achieve carbon peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. 

We are doing solid ground work. It’s not a slogan or “campaign-style” work that could lead to [short-term] reductions that later rebound. If we want to reduce them sustainably, a systematic change in the economy and society is needed. This systematic change must come from the perspectives just mentioned, and we must do some ground work. [The changes brought about by] some work may not be fast in the short term, as [emissions] are still in a climbing stage, and the total amount [of emissions] has not been completely reduced. But this is what we are doing in the short term to prepare for the long term, and the short term is a stage that we can’t avoid.

CB: We previously published an analysis that China may have already achieved carbon peak in 2023, based on data. What do you think about this research finding?

WC: I think predicting a peak is not a scientific approach. So far, I have not seen any indicators or studies that can predict a country has reached a peak. It is something that must be judged by time, and it may take several years [after a peak appears to occur] because emissions may rebound. Of course, there are many factors to consider in analysis and research, such as the growth of the population, the growth of the economy, industrial structure, and energy demand and the energy technology behind it. 

There are many indicators that could help us do this analysis. Based on analysis of the existing indicators, I think it is not wrong to [say China has] reached its peak in 2023, and this is definitely credible. But I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025. Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends, including the systematic preparations we have made and the determination of the central government work towards the “dual carbon” goals, we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.

[Carbon Brief analysis published since this interview took place shows that China’s CO2 emissions stopped rising for the last 10 months of 2024, but still grew slightly overall.]

CB: Your previous work has pointed towards the economic benefits of electrification as an approach to cutting emissions. The IEA [International Energy Agency] has also recently highlighted China’s rapid progress on this front. Can you talk about China’s strategy here, the current situation with electrification and what China can do to move forward?

WC: In my articles, electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other. Renewable energy replaces fossil energy and builds a new power system – a goal we hope to achieve for net-zero [efforts]. In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful. Why is that? Because electrification at the end-use has implications for energy saving and can also adjust the unstable supply of renewable energy. At the same time, electrification can better absorb some energy storage facilities [integrate energy storage into the energy system] and accelerate energy storage’s technological progress. In addition, electrification reduces dependence on fossil energy. It is not in an “either/or” [zero-sum game] with renewable energy. The more renewable energy develops, the more confident we are that it should be used for end-use consumption. 

CB: Can you please explain a bit more? How can electrification ‘absorb energy storage’? 

WC: Electrification is the direct consumption of energy at the end-use, such as boilers. So when we talk about electrification, we need to look at what is being electrified. Electrification is [using electric boilers] to replace the use of coal-fired and natural gas-fired boilers for heating in industries, or using electric vehicles (EVs) to replace gasoline cars, or using induction cookers to replace natural gas for cooking. All these directly reduce [the consumption of] fossil energy. 

[If] all the traditional fossil energy uses are replaced by electricity, our demand for energy storage will not grow. EVs are applications of lithium batteries being used in the automotive field. Heat pumps and electronic heat pumps for industr[ial production] can also be equipped with energy storage. This opens up a new demand for energy storage at the end-use. Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy. As we mentioned above, energy storage is a link in this system.

CB: Electric heat pumps are generally used in the south while central heating with coal is more common in the north. Are there methods, such as policy support, that can help the north to quickly transfer to heat pumps?  

WC: I am not particularly clear about this issue, but I believe that it is centred on technical difficulties. Because the demand for heat in the north is more fundamental and urgent than that in the south. For example, heating under low temperature conditions is a livelihood issue [in the north]. In the south, the demand for heat pumps may be met by low-temperature boilers for production, which can be produced today, tonight, or tomorrow, with certain production flexibility. Therefore, the supply of heat pumps in the south is not so urgent. In the north, [central heating with coal] can be more secure. So there may be different [requirements] in security, technology and applicability of heat pumps. I think it is not just a policy issue, it needs further developments in technology.

CB: What do you think about hydrogen?

WC: I would think that, just like electrification, it may be a very important technical field for the construction of a carbon-neutral technology system in the future. One of the characteristics of renewable energy, once the supply becomes high, is that it is intermittent, so it requires energy storage. Energy storage means that it can store energy when there is no demand, and provide some when supply cannot meet demand. [Hydrogen] is both a better energy storage and a way to develop chemical reserves, because its production method, electrolysis, can use surplus renewable energy. This surplus renewable energy comes from solar and wind energy. 

Such an energy storage method is [different from] traditional hydrogen production, where hydrogen is a by-product of the chemical industry or even converted directly from oil and fossil fuels. This is a [current] trend and form of energy conversion, not a form of energy storage. [But] in the carbon-neutral technical system, hydrogen is a form of energy storage. 

The core difference is a power system featured with renewable energy, whose marginal cost is very low – almost zero marginal running costs. So after wind and solar are deployed – after the costs of infrastructure and fixed asset investment – the cost for electricity generation via wind and solar is almost zero. The zero marginal running cost can be used for electrolysis. You can understand it as using zero cost for hydrogen production. At that time, the cost of hydrogen will be very low.

CB: But I heard the cost for hydrogen production is quite high currently?

WC: Yes, that’s because enough progress hasn’t been made yet. When we are still using water electrolysis to make hydrogen, the cost of wind and solar power is spread over the electricity used to electrolyse water. It is not using surplus [renewable] electricity for electrolysis, because there is not that much surplus electricity. When the proportion of wind and solar power in our power system reaches a certain level, there will be more surplus electricity. In order to store the surplus electricity, we currently use lithium batteries and other [technologies] to store this electricity, instead of using electrolysis to make hydrogen. So I think hydrogen is a new form of energy storage. 

At the same time, hydrogen is also a clean new energy form for end-use. It can replace natural gas and gasoline. After it is converted into ammonia, it can also replace oil used in heavy trucks and even cruise ships. It is a foreseeable clean energy form and an end-use energy. So I think it is very critical. There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail. So it is a key and indispensable technology.

The interview was conducted by Wanyuan Song at COP29 in Baku on 16 November 2024.